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Gaining Technical Know-How in an Unequal World: Penicillin Manufacture in Nehru's India 
I. Introduction 
For the first of the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial lectures held at New Delhi in 1967, 
P.M.S. Blackett chose the theme of “Science and Technology in an Unequal World.”1 
This was an apt choice of topic. For on the one hand, throughout his active public life, 
Jawaharlal Nehru had been convinced that the key to initiating a comprehensive process 
of development lay in the application of the results of scientific and technological enquiry 
to the problems confronting Indian society.2 Equally, Nehru was aware that India’s own 
scientific and technological base could not provide more than a small fraction of the 
effort required to provide the solutions to these problems.3 As the Prime Minister of 
Independent India, he was thus confronted with the task of identifying, and then 
accessing, foreign sources of technology. This was a task which raised complex issues, 
quite distinct from the technical problems of the “transfer of technology” from a foreign 
source to a local recipient.4 While Nehru’s experience as a nationalist politician might 
have provided him with an understanding of the power relations underlying the ground 
realities of international relations, the practical issues that might arise in the course of 
negotiating technology acquisitions could not be foreseen. It was through a condensation 
of the experience that India had accumulated in the twenty years since Independence that 
Blackett was led to the conclusion that the problems of enabling development in this 
“unequal world,” through science and technology, raised generic issues worthy of special 
attention in a memorial lecture.5  
The article that follows concentrates on a specific industrial project, and events that took 
place over a four-year period, between late 1950 and mid 1954. This was the period, as 
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the article attempts to show, when the contours of the post-war world order, both political 
and technological, began to impress themselves on the Indian political leadership. The 
defining features of the new world order, politically, were the formation of an integrated 
economic system consisting of the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe (the 
“Second World”) and, simultaneously,  the process of decolonization, which was to lead 
to the grouping of the “Third World” countries. Technologically, the specialized agencies 
of the United Nations, particularly UNICEF, UNESCO, and later the United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) provided unprecedented means of access to 
scientific and technological knowledge. This new world order greatly expanded the range 
of options open to countries such as India. Major decisions of the subsequent period 
attempting the creation of a broad based program of industrialization, could now be taken 
with some degree of confidence as to the probable outcomes.6 
 
As early as 1946, a year before Independence, the Government of India began to explore 
the possibilities of manufacturing pharmaceutical products, particularly those related to 
the prevention and treatment of communicable diseases. In 1946 and 1948, technical 
teams visited plants in Western Europe and North America and recommended the 
manufacture of Penicillin, Paludrine and three Sulfa Drugs.7 In January 1949, the 
Government examined these recommendations and decided to set up a corporation in the 
public sector to produce these pharmaceutical products.8 As the Government of India and 
the Government of the then Bombay State had jointly sponsored the project, the 
Government of India established, in April 1949, the Committee on the Penicillin Project 
to represent the interests of both governments. By the end of 1950, serious differences 
over the strategy to be followed led to the direct intervention of Jawaharlal Nehru.9 This 
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intervention was to lead, as this article shows, to momentous decisions on the strategy 
underlying the acquisition of technology for corporations in the public sector.  
 
II. The divide on technology strategy 
 
In the early post Second World War period, Indian industrialists sought foreign technical 
collaboration in order to establish enterprises in new industrial areas. They were 
disappointed to find that this collaboration was not available without their granting some 
degree of ownership in the new firm to the foreign technology supplier. From their recent 
experience of colonial subordination, industrialists were unanimous in rejecting any 
substantial proportion of foreign ownership in their firms.10 Fortunately for them, the 
Government of Independent India supported a policy of developing Indian owned and 
managed companies and introduced strict import controls to prevent the supply of foreign 
goods to the Indian market. When the threat of this “import substitution-based” 
industrialization became a reality in later years, firms in the advanced industrial countries 
faced the prospect of their products being excluded from the Indian market altogether. In 
this situation, they found it expedient to license their product and process know-how to 
Indian firms so that they retained some influence in the Indian market. Many Western 
firms were then prepared to license their technology without insisting on any ownership 
rights for themselves in exchange for royalties and lump sum payment. These agreements 
were always reached after hard bargaining and as there was no well defined market for 
technology, the outcome depended on the specific nature of the technology, on possible 
substitutes and, finally, on the relative negotiating skill of the two parties to the 
agreement.11  
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This strategy may be observed in the responses of Pfizer, Glaxo and Merck in the present 
case of the development of penicillin manufacture. In the early, relatively non-
controversial, months of the Committee on the Penicillin Project, each firm offered 
marginal, though still important distinctions, in their proposals for collaboration. Glaxo 
merely agreed to import pure penicillin in bulk, and to use Bombay as a base for bottling 
therapeutic doses of the drug. Pfizer offered the Government the option of importing 
crude penicillin in bulk, to be refined and subsequently formulated.12 Merck, one of the 
principle protagonists of this article, offered collaboration in establishing a manufacturing 
base, a major advance on the competing proposals, although the exact terms of the 
technical transfer process are not available.  
 
While these negotiations were continuing, a new proposal for penicillin manufacture was 
suggested to the Government of India by UNICEF and the World Health Organization 
(WHO). This project, which envisaged the development of an antibiotic research and 
training centre linked to the penicillin manufacturing unit, represented not simply another 
manufacturing option. It challenged the prevailing wisdom on the feasible methods of 
establishing a manufacturing base, by demonstrating the possibility of accessing technical 
know-how itself, rather than depending on licensed production. This option had presented 
itself after K.C.K.E. Raja, the Director General of Health Services (DGHS) of the 
Government of India, had held initial discussions with UNICEF, after which the UNICEF 
officials had met the Penicillin Committee. As WHO were UNICEF’s technical advisors, 
the Penicillin Committee were asked to obtain WHO’s approval for their scheme. A 
memorandum was prepared and sent to UNICEF, while Raja agreed to take up the matter 
with WHO in Geneva. At this meeting, N. L. Macpherson of WHO told Raja that WHO 
could not recommend any project involving a commercial concern for UNICEF help. 
This effectively ruled out any collaboration for licensed manufacture. Macpherson 
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recommended that the proposed agreement with Merck Inc. be ignored, and gave an 
assurance that WHO could provide all the technical know-how and help. 
  
Licensed manufacture had, by this time, become precisely the option preferred by 
industrialists, and the Government of India’s decision to select Neville N. Wadia as the 
Chairperson of the Penicillin Committee was apparently made to ensure the 
representation of the interests of the major industrialists. Wadia, Chairperson of the 
family owned textile firm of Bombay Dyeing, had no obvious credentials for chairing the 
Penicillin Committee, beyond the fact that he was currently the President of the Bombay 
Millowners Association, the most cohesive and powerful bloc of industrialists.  
 
Contrary to the view held by the WHO representative, Macpherson, G. Sankaran, 
technical advisor of the Penicillin Committee felt WHO’s assurance had no firm basis, as 
no one in WHO had experience of working in a large-scale penicillin plant. In any case, 
Sankaran held that such persons would be unable to disclose information without a 
breach of faith, as they were bound to secrecy. Sankaran reiterated that it was essential to 
gain experience in working in a large-scale plant, and that it was necessary to collaborate 
with Merck. Raja suggested that Sankaran should be sent to Geneva to argue the 
technical points as he himself was not competent to do so. Although the Penicillin 
Committee agreed, permission from Nehru himself was required to go abroad on 
Government work. When Nehru was approached, he refused permission 
 
Wadia felt that through this decision, the Penicillin Committee had been deprived of the 
opportunity of obtaining detailed information on the basis of which the Government of 
India could be properly advised of the relative merits of the Merck and UNICEF/WHO 
proposals. On the basis of this experience, Wadia felt that he could not work the project 
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in a business like manner anymore.   He was therefore writing to Nehru to request him to 
intercede to ensure that the proposed organization which was to undertake the penicillin 
project was registered as a corporation in the public sector, where the Board of Directors 
was free to act, except in matters of major policy.13   
 
This was a situation that Nehru would have presumably have wished to avoid. For if this 
proposal were accepted, the strategy favored by Bombay’s big industrialists for 
establishing a manufacturing base through licensed collaborations might also set the 
pattern for corporations in the public sector. This pattern would then determine the degree 
of technical knowledge actually transferred in all future public sector projects 
III. UNICEF and WHO enter the scene 
 
A month later, the terms of the UNICEF/WHO proposal were made clear.14 UNICEF 
would provide a grant to the Government of India of $850 000 for equipment for a 
penicillin factory, while WHO would contribute $350 000, also as a grant, for sending 
technical personnel to establish the factory. These personnel would design the plant, 
supervise erection and commissioning, establish the plant in operation, and train 
scientists, engineers and technicians. The Government of India was to agree that the plant 
would be free of links to commercial firms that might demand that manufacturing 
methods be kept secret, and to ensure that it would function as part of a group of 
international training centres in the field of antibiotics that UNICEF/WHO were in the 
process of establishing. 
 
This information was first conveyed in a letter to Nehru by Santokh Singh Sokhey, leader 
of the two post war technical teams mentioned earlier, formerly Director of the Bombay-
based Haffkine Institute, and at that time, an Assistant Director General in WHO. 
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According to Sokhey, the Penicillin Committee was wrong in their belief that the 
UNICEF/WHO proposal would mean a delay of a year. He asserted that WHO could 
complete the project faster than the Committee could do in collaboration with Merck. He 
pleaded that Merck should not be paid royalties, which would amount to at least $175 
000 per year for 15 years. Also, that Neville Wadia who was in New York, presumably 
negotiating with Merck should be instructed not to commit India to an arrangement that 
would preclude UNICEF/WHO financial and technical aid.  
 
In early December 1950, official confirmation of the UNICEF/WHO proposal reached 
Nehru directly from the WHO Director General, Brock Chisholm.15 He confirmed that in 
addition to $850 000 from UNICEF for equipment, $350 000 would be available from 
WHO under the UN Technical Assistance Fund for providing technical personnel for 
plant design, erection, and commencing operation and for staff  training. The penicillin 
plant was part of a worldwide UNICEF/WHO antibiotic program. It would be used as an 
international research and training centre, linked to a network of similar research centres 
in other countries. It was therefore essential that the plant should not be linked to any 
commercial firm that would demand that the processes be kept secret.16 The assurance on 
this point given by the Government of India representative (Raja, Director General 
Health Services) had, in fact, influenced the Technical Assistance Board’s decision to 
grant funds. 
 
Continuing, the WHO Director General wrote that the argument that commercial firms 
were better able to provide superior technical knowledge was discounted by WHO 
experts. They felt that any slight improvement by one company would be matched within 
weeks by others. The new venture would, with growing experience, prove its own 
efficiency in the same way. Linked with the international research centres, the Indian 
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venture would also produce knowledge of value even to commercial organizations. The 
WHO Director General concluded his proposal by linking action on the UNICEF grant to 
a request from the Government of India to WHO asking for the complimentary aid. 
IV. The Larger Considerations underlying UNICEF/WHO support 
 
As Sokhey had surmised, the project was certainly symbolic of the role that United 
Nations’ Agencies were staking out in the post war world. In a letter to one of his 
confidants, the Minister of Health, Nehru made it clear that he was not convinced that 
Merck was the sole supplier of particular patented processes.17 He was sure that 
UNICEF/WHO must have competent people to advise the Government of India, or at the 
least, these advisors could themselves negotiate with Merck. As he was about to leave for 
England he advised the Minister of Health that though he felt that the Government of 
India could not refuse the WHO proposal, the decision should be taken after Wadia’s 
return, without waiting for his own presence.  
 
As the Director General of Health Services, Raja, the most senior technical official in the 
Health Ministry, was later to comment, Nehru’s reply in December 1950 to the WHO 
Director General, Brock Chisholm, had virtually committed India to accepting the 
UNICEF/WHO proposal. If this was the case, then the question arises as to why, when 
both the Minister for Health, and the Prime Minister himself were in favor of 
UNICEF/WHO, it took the Government of India another four months to give a formal 
approval to the proposal. The answer lies in two factors, in the infirmities of the Patents 
Act as discussed in Section VI below, that allowed the pre-emptive filing of patents to 
prevent the growth of competitive manufacturing facilities; and the hostility to 
UNICEF/WHO displayed by the Chairperson of the Penicillin Committee, Neville 
Wadia.   
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In Sokhey’s perception Wadia, who lacked the background knowledge of the 
technological implications for self-reliance underlying the two United Nations Agencies’ 
initiative, was led astray by the salesmanship of the transnational pharmaceutical 
corporations. To counter these still potent influences, Sokhey intended to bring Nobel 
Laureate E.B. Chain (Professor of Biochemistry at the Instituto Superiore di Sanita in 
Rome) and N. L. Macpherson, the WHO Penicillin Team Leader to meet Nehru during 
his visit to London in early January 1951.18 He felt that there was no purpose in writing 
letters to officials in Delhi who were indifferent to the issues involved. 
V. The Contest: Transfer of Know-How vs. licensed manufacture 
 
While Nehru was in London, Wadia returned to India with the terms on which Merck was 
prepared to collaborate. Learning of this, Nehru sent a telegram to the Finance Minister 
suggesting that no commitments should be made to Merck on behalf of the Government 
of India until a conference was held where the issues could be discussed and settled. The 
Finance Minister, C.D. Deshmukh, replied that while the advantages of the 
UNICEF/WHO offer were clear, there was a commitment to return the financial 
assistance in the form of free supplies of penicillin to WHO.19 This obligation had to be 
weighed against the possible advantages of collaboration with a firm of Merck’s 
reputation. He suggested that Sokhey should be invited to the conference in New Delhi 
where the merits of the two schemes would be finally evaluated. It was clear that the 
Finance Minister did not comprehend the larger issues that made the UNICEF/WHO 
scheme attractive to Nehru and the Health Minister  
 
While the WHO Director-General Chisholm was not prepared to allow his officials to 
enter into debates with commercial firms, Sokhey was prepared to take the initiative to 
travel to India in early February 1951 to provide any information required. Telegraphing 
 10 
his response to Deshmukh, Nehru said that he was convinced that the WHO offer must be 
accepted.20 The project had the support of United Nations Agencies, who wished to use 
the production plant as a training centre linked to an international group of research 
laboratories. While the reputation of WHO was visibly at stake, as an organization it had 
no particular interest to promote.  What was more, according to Nehru, the eminent 
scientists who first discovered the process of concentrating penicillin (presumably 
Howard Florey and E.B. Chain), and the people who built large production complexes 
and research laboratories, supported WHO. A Government connection with WHO would 
open up larger areas of collaboration for the country, making it an international centre for 
research and production. A significant indication of the prestige of UNICEF and WHO in 
these early post-war years was the commitment made by the United States’ State 
Department to provide special priority for purchase and export of the capital equipment 
needed for the UNICEF/WHO project.21 All that the United Nations’ Agencies required 
of the Government was an open door scientific policy, and the free supply of penicillin to 
Indian children through publicly funded health programs.22  Nehru pointed out that in the 
prevailing circumstances, India risked alienating the scientific world if, for any reason, 
collaboration with Merck was preferred. An indication of the possible repercussions was 
provided by the offence caused to senior WHO staff by a questionnaire that Wadia had 
sent to the organization. Particularly inappropriate, in Nehru’s view, was the demand for 
a personal guarantee to be given by the WHO Director General on the performance of the 
penicillin plant. 
 
With both Nehru and Sokhey in New Delhi in early February 1951, a series of 
Conferences were held between the most senior of the Ministers in the Government of 
India and WHO and UNICEF officials. In the course of preparation for the first of these 
conferences, it became clear to Nehru that the tenacity of the views against collaboration 
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with the United Nations’ Agencies was due not only to differences over how penicillin 
was to be manufactured. It also signified that the implications of the project extended 
beyond the more general and critical issues of technology policy and the form of public 
sector intervention in industrial development. This was evidently the understanding that 
Nehru himself had held earlier.23 
 
It was now clear to Nehru that UNICEF and WHO were organizations that drew their 
influence from the international support that they had from most of the countries in the 
world. Once organizations of this stature supported a project, there could be no question 
of their failing in the effort. There would be, in fact, considerable odium attached to the 
decision to refuse the WHO project. This consideration was reinforced by the strong 
reservations Nehru had against involving the Government in collaboration with large 
transnational corporations, especially in the sensitive area of pharmaceuticals. 
 
It is significant that in two cases of large scale civil engineering projects, the Bhakra 
Nangal Dam in Punjab State, and the excavation of a tunnel linking Jammu with Srinagar 
in Jammu and Kashmir State, Nehru opted decisively for complete project control by 
foreign firms, or at least for the leadership of foreign engineering consultants. In 
significant contrast to his position on the penicillin project, Nehru wrote:24 
 
I am anxious and eager to help Indian firms and Indian engineers and technicians 
and not to have foreign firms undertaking major works in India where they can be 
dispensed with. But I am quite clear in my mind that the most important test is the 
experience of the firm and their technical competence. In relatively small projects 
special experience might not be needed, but in a large project that experience is of 
the first importance. If it is clear that the foreign firm has this experience and 
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technical competence then I would choose that firm almost regardless of other 
factors. 
 
While help could thus be sought for a particular scheme such as a river valley project or 
other similar projects involving complex civil construction, collaboration in a 
manufacturing enterprise, Nehru evidently felt, would imply political subordination on a 
continuing basis. This distinction was evidently based on the realization of the vast 
difference in the degree of technological knowledge possessed by the foreign technology 
supplier as compared to the Indian recipient in the case of the acquisition of 
manufacturing technology. Mere acquaintance with the successful operation of the 
manufacturing enterprise did not conclusively mean that this knowledge gap had been 
filled.  In contrast, as long as Indians were included at senior levels in projects involving 
the creation of a technological artefact, such as a dam or tunnel, the knowledge could 
reasonably be expected to percolate to the Indians.  
 
Nehru emphasised the reality: transnational corporations were “tough” and could well 
attempt to influence the directions of research that the Government of India wished its 
complex of research laboratories to undertake. At the most fundamental level was the 
consideration that: 25  
We have built up a considerable number of laboratories and I have 
specially laid stress on research and the scientific approach, rather than the 
commercial approach to scientific problems. The commercial approach 
can pay dividends in a country like the U.S. where the whole basis of the 
social structure is commercial and individual profit making. We cannot 
emulate the U.S. in this and have to find a different way, a way in which 
the State takes a large hand and science has free play. To some extent, this 
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free play of science is limited by the buying up of talent by commercial 
firms for their own advantage. We become parties to this latter process, if 
we try to develop under the aegis of a big foreign commercial firm. 
 
The essential point here was that there was a distinction to be made between the research 
priorities set by the demands of an industry, and those set by an individual firm within the 
industry. The issue was further complicated if the individual firm was part of a 
transnational group, whose research priorities might be set by very distinct 
considerations. Concluding his letter to the Finance Minister, C.D. Deshmukh, Nehru 
remarked on the fact that during his visit to England, he had heard complaints at the most 
senior level of Government. These centred on the question of British autonomy in 
decision making having been curtailed by the compromises they had made with large 
transnational corporations from the United States. He was concerned that the planning 
process in India should be as free as possible from such externally imposed constraints. 
In a significant indication of his recognition that the industrialists did not all share this 
view, he ended by suggesting that the Government of India should disengage from the 
then Government of Bombay State. This latter Government was clearly being subjected 
to pulls in a direction contrary not only to his own vision of development of the 
pharmaceutical industry, howsoever critical this was, but to the very path of National 
Development itself.  
 
On his return to Geneva from India in March 1951 Sokhey met Chain at the Instituto 
Superiore di Sanita in Rome. In a letter recording the results of these discussions, Chain 
emphasised that chemical microbiology was a new and expanding field of biochemistry, 
in which India had a right to expect to play a major part.26 To do so, it was necessary that 
the research facility should be attached to an antibiotics production plant. Chain gave, in 
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the course of his letter, a significant indication of his understanding of the relationship 
between scientific research and the generation of technology relevant know-how.  He 
stated that “…Production of antibiotics will stimulate research problems in all aspects of 
the field of chemical microbiology, and vice-versa, advances in research will be reflected 
immediately on the production capacity of the plant.” 
 
Chain continued in his letter to say “It is obviously essential that conditions be created in 
this research laboratory in which the Indian workers can carry out their tasks in a 
scientific atmosphere free from commercial secrecy and in close collaboration with 
scientists in other countries.” These conditions could be ideally met if the Government of 
India accepted the UNICEF/WHO offer of collaboration, and “…cooperate [d] with the 
International Research Laboratories linked with WHO.” 
VI. Patents, Secret Processes, and Tacit Knowledge  
 
The question of patents had arisen on various occasions in the course of consideration of 
the UNICEF/WHO proposal. With larger political considerations as expressed in Nehru’s 
letter of early February appearing to favor the United Nations Agencies, the 
manufacturing processes to be used by WHO came increasingly under scrutiny. For 
Nehru and his Cabinet, there were three issues to be comprehended. The first was the 
distinction between a secret process and a patented one; the second was whether there 
was effective patent protection anywhere for the key processes involved in penicillin 
manufacture, and the third was whether patents filed under the existing Indian Patent law 
were legally enforceable. Chain dealt with the second and third issues.27 The essential 
steps involved in the extraction of penicillin, which formed the basis for large scale 
manufacture, had been described in papers co-authored by him which dealt with the 
chemotherapeutic properties of penicillin, in Lancet and the British Journal of 
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Experimental Pathology, ten years previously. Chain did not think that any patents in the 
penicillin field were enforceable, though this would depend on the legal structure in 
specific countries. To the best of his knowledge no case had been upheld by the courts 
anywhere, though this was obviously a matter for patent lawyers to assess.28   
 
Nehru was also able to get the advice of Edward Mellanby, Secretary of the British 
Medical Council, who was invited in March 1951 to India to be briefed on the issues, and 
to give his views.29 For Mellanby, there were two major points for decision. The first was 
whether the WHO team led by Macpherson would be able to lead the penicillin project to 
successful completion. The second was whether the manufacture of penicillin was 
sufficiently well known and standardized, so that the scheme was unlikely to fail because 
of any ignorance of tacit elements of knowledge required to operate, maintain and quality 
control the production process. After a meeting in Bombay, Mellanby was confident that 
Macpherson could successfully complete the task, if he was the leader of the team.  
 
Mellanby gave no details of how he had reached the conclusion that Macpherson not only 
had the competence to build a large scale penicillin plant, but had the ability to do so 
without infringing on any commitments to maintain commercial secrecy, a particularly 
critical issue given the post-war experience of British firms.30  It will be recalled that 
Sankaran, Technical Advisor to the Penicillin Committee had raised precisely these 
issues in support of his recommendation that collaboration with a large scale commercial 
organization was the only feasible method of initiating penicillin production. However, 
the details of the wartime efforts to develop commercially viable methods of production 
and Macpherson’s own earlier career provide the basis for comprehending Mellanby’s 
confidence.  
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The development of commercially viable penicillin production processes was centred on 
the Northern Regional Research Laboratories of the United States Department of 
Agriculture, in Peoria, Illinois. These efforts, however, took place under war-enforced 
conditions of mutual pooling of the results of production oriented research within 
laboratories attached both to universities and to large corporations.31  The Connaught 
Medical Research Laboratories at the University of Toronto were one of the two 
Canadian Organizations represented on the wartime research pooling effort and were 
included within the system of consultation and communication.32 Before joining WHO in 
1951 Macpherson had worked at the Connaught Laboratories as a Chemical Technologist 
and gained experience of large scale penicillin production. He had, in fact, been the chief 
initiator of the submerged culture process, including equipment design, at the Connaught 
Laboratories. According to a pamphlet published by the Connaught Laboratories, 
research had led to the development of a specific strain of mold, as also a method to 
crystallize penicillin by a unique method. Thus, although the Connaught production 
technology drew on the wartime work coordinated by the War Production Board, it had 
developed expertise in the entire production chain.33 Sokhey and another colleague from 
the Bombay city based Haffkine Institute had, in fact, visited the Connaught 
Laboratories, and been trained there in the design of penicillin plants. 34  
 
Mellanby warned that the technical process of penicillin production was still full of 
snags. However, the problems were not insuperable and the project would have the 
advice of all those associated with WHO. Mellanby assessed that production in a plant 
established with Merck support might well progress more quickly and the product could 
be cheaper to the consumer, at least initially. However, Merck’s onerous financial terms 
(royalty for 15 years and continued financial obligations even after that) did not seem 
worthwhile for penicillin production. For more complex chemotherapeutic drugs such as 
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paludrine, in contrast, Mellanby would certainly have recommended association with a 
western firm with experience in the process of synthesis of organic chemicals.35 
 
Macpherson, through the mediation of Mellanby and Nehru, had managed to convince 
the Cabinet of the technological feasibility of the UNICEF/WHO proposal. However, 
during this same stay in Bombay where he met Mellanby and convinced him of his case, 
the meetings with the Penicillin Committee did not proceed satisfactorily.36 According to 
a letter by Nehru to Sokhey in Geneva, the discussion did not cover precisely the points 
for which the meeting had been called, that is, the specifications of the processes that 
WHO intended to use. Nehru was mystified by Macpherson’s reticence in the matter, and 
also frustrated by the inability to carry the State Government of Bombay along. The 
WHO representative’s apparently inexplicable caginess had, all of a sudden, given new 
impetus to the opponents of the scheme.   
 
During his stay in India, Macpherson had examined the patents that had been filed under 
the Indian Patents Act, which might possibly serve as a constraint on the UNICEF/WHO 
proposal to manufacture penicillin.37 He found that, while the large majority covered 
processes that were not to be considered in the scheme he proposed, patents did cover 
four necessary processes. Of these, Macpherson was sure that in the case of one the 
patent was not applicable, in the case of two others he was doubtful, while in the last 
case, he considered that it definitely covered the penicillin manufacturing process. Inspite 
of these assessments, some members of the Penicillin Committee felt that more extensive 
use of patented processes would, in fact, be required. So, Macpherson was asked to 
specify the processes that WHO intended to use. These he was unwilling to do, on the 
scarcely credible grounds that there was a lack of time. This reticence infected the 
generally positive approach to the UNICEF/WHO proposal, and Nehru wrote to the 
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WHO Director General asking for his intervention on what was apparently a simple 
matter of more open communication. This hitch in finalising the proposal was also the 
occasion for the productivity of the WHO manufacturing process itself to be questioned. 
If it was less techno-commercially competitive than methods used by commercial 
corporations to make penicillin, the Government of India, Nehru indicated in his letter to 
WHO, wished to be free to improve the process through alternative, though unspecified, 
sources.38 
 
WHO’s response was as acerbic as a United Nations’ Agency, of which the Government 
of India was a member, could afford to be.39 It was pointed out that the problem had 
arisen as a result of the lack of co-operation by the Penicillin Committee. In fact, 
Sankaran, the Technical Member of the Committee had to be specifically instructed by 
the Finance Minister, C.D. Deshmukh, even to meet Macpherson. The letter from WHO 
admitted that it was true that the Secretary of the Production Ministry, A.V. Pai, had 
asked Macpherson to provide detailed specifications of the processes he intended to use. 
However, Macpherson met Pai, explained the situation to him, and was evidently able to 
satisfy him as to why “…the drawing up of specifications was not necessary.” In the next 
section of this article, a hypothesis will be offered as to why Macpherson felt that this 
information could not be shared with the Penicillin Committee. 
 
The letter from WHO continued with a discussion of the patents issue. The four 
processes, for which there was a possibility of a hitch because of one of the processes 
being covered by an existing patent protection under the Indian Patent Act, were further 
examined in Geneva by WHO’s advisors on Macpherson’s return in late March 1951. 
The patent application for the first of these processes, the use of corn steep liquor in the 
culture medium, was filed on September 25, 1945. However, on December 15, 1944, this 
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process was the subject of a lecture by Dr K.Ganapathi of the Bombay Haffkine Institute 
given at the Indian Pharmaceutical Association, subsequently published in July 1945 in 
the Indian Journal of Pharmacy. This instance of prior publication was held to invalidate 
the patent. In any event, WHO was considering using a synthetic medium rather than 
corn steep liquor for production in India. 
 
The second process concerned the use of a precursor in the medium. This was the 
doubtful case in Macpherson’s early estimation, because precursors were used in all 
processes of penicillin manufacture. However, it appeared that the patent holders were 
not the first discoverers of the process.40 Several firms were known to be using 
precursors without paying royalties. In any case, as the substance used as precursor was a 
constituent of the culture medium, it was doubtful whether adding an extra amount 
qualified as a novelty.  
 
The third process involved the use of butanol in crystallization. This had been published 
in the British Medical Journal in January 1945, and freely circulated in India almost two 
years before the patent application was filed in November 1946. Considerations of prior 
publication applied here, too, thereby invalidating the patent application. The fourth 
process concerned procaine penicillin manufacture. No patent was, however, valid for a 
substance resulting from the reaction of a base and an acid. Alternative methods were 
available, in any case, to produce procaine penicillin and the fourth Indian patent would 
not therefore be a hurdle for the commercial production of penicillin. 
  
In this background, the WHO advisors were satisfied with the patent situation but were 
also consulting specialists in London on the matter. All other processes required for 
manufacturing penicillin were well known and details had been published. In WHO’s 
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opinion, there was therefore no obstacle posed by the patents issue. On the question of 
productivity, WHO was categorical that using well known and publicly available 
processes, production could exceed the levels suggested by Merck several times, once 
sufficient experience with the manufacturing process had been gained in India. The letter 
from WHO of early April 1951 ended with a polite reminder that further delays in 
Government of India approval to the project could lead to the redeployment elsewhere of 
the UNICEF/WHO grant offered in December 1950.  
 
Sokhey followed with his own letter a week later. He confirmed that patent attorneys in 
London, familiar with both the Indian Patent Act, and with penicillin manufacture, had 
given their opinion that the patents filed in India were not valid, and that “…no firm 
could extract royalties by bringing law suits.”41 He also addressed the question of the 
supposedly secret process that enabled Merck to claim substantially lower production 
costs, and to use that to justify the royalty of 3 to 5 million dollars (in then current prices) 
in total. As a representative of the Penicillin Committee, Sokhey had met in 1950 an 
official of the Swedish firm, Karnbogalet, with whom the Government of India was then 
negotiating for penicillin manufacturing technology. The claim made by this firm on 
behalf of Merck was, again, about a process of which Merck were not the originators. 
The originators, according to the representative of the Swedish firm, were two scientists 
of the University of Wisconsin at Madison. A paper describing the process had, in fact, 
been published in 1950 by the discoverers in the journal of “Industrial Engineering 
Chemistry” easily accessible in the Haffkine Institute library in Bombay.42 
VIII. Private Capital’s hidden agenda 
 
There remained two points of controversy which required resolution before the 
Government of India could take a final decision on the merits of the UNICEF/WHO 
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scheme. The first lay in the processes that Macpherson intended to use, and the second 
lay in the actual production capabilities of the plant proposed. Raja, the Director General 
Health Services, was sent to Geneva to clarify the issues43. 
 
The most intriguing information that Raja provided was Sokhey’s explanation for the 
uncommunicative behavior of Macpherson during his stay in Bombay. Sokhey asserted 
(and Raja felt it appropriate to “pass that on” to the Minister of Health and to Nehru), that 
Neville Wadia, as a capitalist, was on close terms with the management of both Glaxo 
and Merck. Not only would any information given to Wadia or the Penicillin Committee 
be given to these firms, but that the basis for Sankaran’s queries to WHO was supplied by 
Glaxo.  
 
There were a number of methods of crystallization involved in penicillin production. If 
any private firm wished to take the Government of India to court under the Patents Act, 
the onus of proving patent infringement would be on the firm. Under these 
circumstances, if Macpherson were to commit in writing to the processes he intended to 
use, this information would be crucial to the outcome of the case. Initially, Wadia, 
Chairperson of the Penicillin Committee had wanted Macpherson to provide the entire 
Committee with details of the processes he intended to use. Subsequently, he modified 
the position, and allowed Sankaran to meet Macpherson privately, in fact suggesting that 
if Sankaran were satisfied with the patent position, Wadia would himself support the 
WHO proposal. According to the earlier WHO letter written to Nehru explaining the 
patent situation, Sankaran had given the impression to Macpherson that he was more 
concerned with demonstrating the existence of patents, than in addressing the issue of 
whether they were, in fact, a barrier to the UNICEF/WHO proposal.44 Sokhey went 
further in his talk with Raja in Geneva, and claimed that Sankaran, an official of the 
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Government of India, had entirely aligned himself with Wadia and the transnational 
pharmaceutical corporations. It was presumably with precisely this understanding that 
Macpherson had, throughout a three-hour discussion with Sankaran at the Taj Mahal 
Hotel in Bombay, refused to give any details.  
IX. Production and Profitability 
 
The second major issue of controversy was the actual production level from the proposed 
Indian penicillin unit.  Merck claimed 600 000 mega units of penicillin a month using six 
fermenters, whereas the WHO/Macpherson figure was of 400 000 mega units per month 
capacity, also using six fermenters. Sokhey asserted, on the contrary, that with the use of 
the process described in published papers, and with equally commonly available strains 
of penicillin, 1800 units of penicillin per millilitre of the strain were achievable.  
Approximately 97 per cent of this was penicillin G. This translated into a production 
level of 750 000 to 1 500 000 mega units per month, much higher than Merck’s 
production rate. Macpherson had specified the level of 400 000 units as a conservative 
figure, at which production costs would enable the penicillin to be sold at the prevailing 
market prices. 45 
 
Raja, the Director General of Health Services, who had been sent to Geneva to clarify the 
issues, elaborated on the basis for the WHO/Macpherson production figure.46 In the 
proposed plant, there would be six fermenters, each with a capacity of 30 000 litres. 
Fermentation itself took about seventy-two hours, and an equal amount of time was 
estimated as necessary for cleaning the tanks and bringing them back into operational 
conditions, implying six days for each production round. Thus, in a month, there would 
be five rounds of production, and a yield from thirty fermentation tanks. Although the 
classical penicillin strain (Q 176) could give very much higher yields (as Sokhey had 
 23 
suggested), a conservative figure of 700 units of penicillin per millilitre had been 
assumed in Macpherson’s estimate. If, again, the operational capacity of each tank were 
assumed to be 25 000 litres, gross production would be 30*700*25 000, or 525 000 mega 
units per month. Assuming an extraction rate of 80 per cent, net production would be 420 
000, or approximately 400 000 mega units a month. As experience was gained, the three 
days stipulated between each fermentation cycle could be appreciably reduced, and the 
number of cycles each month be correspondingly increased. At a figure considered 
reasonable, of forty-five fermentation tanks per month, production would be 630 000 
mega units per month. 
 
Raja obtained these details from Chain of the Instituto Superiore in Rome. Chain told him 
that Sankaran, the Technical Advisor to the Penicillin Committee, was insufficiently 
familiar with the actual process of penicillin production. Although Raja clarified that he 
was not quoting Chain verbatim, it seems that there was one essential point that Chain 
was attempting to convey to the Government of India. This was that the patent issue 
could not be a barrier to the UNICEF/WHO project as the essential knowledge on which 
the production of penicillin was based was the result of University based laboratory work 
and on collective work undertaken under the auspices of the War Production Board.47 
Equally importantly, Macpherson, through his association with the Connaught 
Laboratories was in the fortunate position of being free from commercial obligations of 
secrecy. At least one explanation for Macpherson’s caginess was now available to the 
Government of India. Armed with this explanation and other, more technical, 
clarifications, the Government of India took a decision at the level of the Union Cabinet 
to accept the UNICEF/WHO proposal on 25 April 1951.48  A formal agreement between 
the Government, UNICEF and WHO was subsequently signed in July 1951. 
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Under the plan, production was to have started in December 1953. This was delayed by 
about a year, the initial “seeding” of penicillin taking place in December 1954 and trial 
production starting in March 1955. Although production levels on a month-to-month 
basis fluctuated appreciably during the first year of operation, by July 1955 the targeted 
scale of production (400 000 mega units a month) was considerably exceeded, and 
production reached a level of 750 000 mega units in January 1956, and 890 000 mega 
units in February.49  
.    
X. Conclusions 
 
It was a signifier of the post Second World War situation that one of the two academic 
researchers, who discovered the process that substantially increased the productivity of 
penicillin production, while working at the University of Wisconsin, left the university to 
join Merck. Equally significantly, his colleague became a part of WHO’s Expert Panel on 
Antibiotics. It was this kind of expert help that enabled the Government of India to 
navigate the shoals of obstacles to the acquisition of technology. On the one hand, there 
were assertions of economic independence by ex-colonial countries. On the other hand, 
there was the determination of industrial countries that this political independence should 
not lead to the loss of markets for technology, even if tariff barriers that accompanied 
import substituting industrialization strategies restricted markets for commodities. It 
would seem not unreasonable to view the question of patents in the case of the Penicillin 
project as an example of the pressures exerted by transnational corporations to retain 
existing markets for technology. The question was not confined to a single plant in India. 
After all, the vision of a research laboratory linked to a production unit on the one hand, 
and to an international network of research and training centres on the other, was not 
confined to the original UNICEF/WHO project document. It had also struck Edward 
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Mellanby, Secretary of the British Medical Council, as the best way to start an entire 
worldwide antibiotics industry “…. free from any private interest.”50   
 
However without the clarity that political experience over many decades had given 
Jawaharlal Nehru, the critical distinction between manufacture on the one hand and the 
creation of even the largest and most complex artefacts, on the other, might never have 
attained operational validity. It was the combination, then, of the immediate post war 
thrust towards internationalism, and the receptivity to these urges which had germinated 
during India’s national movement that made the UNICEF/WHO project a potential 
exemplar of international cooperation.  
 
The episode also brought to Nehru’s notice the extraordinarily skewed focus of the 
existing Patent Law, which was geared more to maintaining a monopoly of 
manufacturing expertise in foreign patent filers’ hands, than in providing reasonable 
rewards to innovators. It was through his direct experience with the problems posed by 
the penicillin project that, the following year, Nehru insisted that steps must be taken to 
modify the Act to ensure that India’s industrialization effort was not needlessly entrapped 
in frivolous claims to priority in developing manufacturing processes. It was also entirely 
appropriate that both the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, and the 
management of Hindustan Antibiotics, the successor to the Penicillin Committee, played 
a major role in the reconsideration of the patents legislation in India in the following 
years.   
Note: All private papers consulted are available in the Archives of the Nehru 
Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi. Except where expressly indicated 
otherwise, material refers to files containing Jawaharlal Nehru’s personal papers, 
post 1947 series, first instalment. 
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